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Buzhardt: Reservations to Strangers to the Deed

RESERVATIONS TO STRANGERS TO THE DEED
INTRODUCTION

The real property laws applied in a large part of the United
States, and especially in South Carolina,' are those developed
and designed for an English society which was predominantly
feudalistic. Although these laws have grown and in some
measure have been modified to ease their stringency, they
remain, except, of course, for statutory changes, for the most
part in their original harshness based on the reason and requirements of bygone age. Despite the fact that the courts
of this country continually declare their dissatisfaction and
distaste for the rigidity and harshness of that part of these
rules for which reasons no longer exist,2 they realize that the
necessity of the quality of stability in this field prevents a
drastic or abrupt change from the cumbersome rules, unless
some basis for the change can be found in the logic or reasoning of the common law. One of the rules of real property
law that has from time to time been the subject of this struggle between the maintenance of stability and the relief from
unjust results of rules for which reason has ceased to exist
is the validity of a reservation in a deed by the grantor to a
third party. This problem usually arises as a result of inadvertence or inept conveyancing where the drafter of a deed
draws what is in terms a reservation to a person other than
the grantor of the deed.
The general requirements for an effective reservation of an
interest in the thing granted in a deed were summarized
around 1641 as follows:
1. For example: retention of the fee simple conditional estate,
Wright v. Herron, 5 Rich. Eq. 442 (S. C. 1853); Withers v. Jenkins, 14

S. C. 597 (1880); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 187 S. C. 86, 196 S. E. 541 (1938);

retention of the requirement of the word "heirs", Lorick & Lowrance v.

MeCreery, 20 S. C. 424 (1883) ; Gowdy v. Kelly, 185 S. C. 415, 194 S. E.
156 (1937).
2. JUSTICE WOODS, speaking of the requirement of words of inheritance, said: "This is the rule of common law from which the courts can
not escape, though its operation nearly always results in the injustice
of defeating the intention of the parties. The rule serves generally as a

snare to those unlearned in technical law, and it would be difficult to

suggest any reason for its continued existence: but it has been so long
established in this State that the courts can not now overrule the cases
laying it down without imperilling (sic) vested rights". Sullivan v.
Moore, 84 S. C. 426, 428, 65 S. E. 108 (1909).
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In every reservation these things must always concur,
1. It must be by apt words. 2. It must be of some thing
issuing, or coming out of the thing granted, and not a
part of the thing itself, nor of something issuing out of
another thing. 3. It must be of such a thing whereunto
the grantor may have resort to distrain. 4. It must be
made to one of the grantors, and not to a stranger to
the deed. As for examples.... if a lease be made, rendering rent to the heirs of the lessor; this reservation is
void because the rent is not reserved to himself first.3
From the example given illustrating the fourth requirement
in the above-quoted passage, it appears that the term "stranger to the deed" actually means one who is a stranger to the
title of the granted premises.
Although the requirements and limitations on the effectiveness of reservations in a deed originated in the English Common Law, the English courts have ceased to experience any
difficulty with a reservation to a stranger to the deed: for in
accord with their policy to effectuate the intention of the
grantor if possible, without violating a rule of law, the English courts regard a reservation as a counter-grant by grantee to grantor in a deed of indenture ;4 and by statute passed
in 1925, the problem is completely eliminated.4 a
... A reservation is the creation in behalf of the grantor
of a new right issuing out of the thing granted, something which did not exist as an independent right before
3. SHEPPARD'S TOUCHSTONE, 80 (Emphasis supplied).
4. Wickham v. Hawker, 7 Mees. & W. 63, 151 Eng. Reprint 685
(1840), where the court considered an indenture deed from A to B with
a reservation of an interest to C and construed the interest to C as a
regrant by B. The Kentucky Court, in Beulein v. Jones, 102 Ky. 570, 44
S. W. 128 (1898), took the further position that the English rule also
applied to a deed poll, as the acceptance of it was held to bind the
grantee to covenants contained therein. For the effect of the grantee's
acceptance of a deed poll upon covenants contained threin, see Giles v.
Pratt, 2 Hill 439 (S. C. 1834); Hammond v. Port Royal & Augusta Ry.
Co., 15 S. C. 10, 33 (1880); Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177
S. C. 308, 313, 314, 181 S. E. 66 (1935) ; WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 214.

4a. "(1) A reservation of a legal estate shall operate at law without
any execution of the conveyance by the grantee of the legal estate out
of which the reservation is made, or any regrant by him, so as to create
the legal estate reserved, and so as to vest the same in possession in
the person (whether being the grantor or not) for whose benefit the
reservation is made.
"(2) A conveyance of a legal estate expressed to be made subject
to another legal estate not in existence immediately before the conveyance, shall operate as a reservation, unless a contrary intention appears."
LAW OF PROPERY ACT, 1925. 15 Geo. 5, Ch. 20 § 65.
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the grant. On the other hand, an exception operates to
withdraw some part of the thing granted which would
otherwise pass to the grantee under the general description, which was in esse at the time of the conveyance,
and which until such conveyance and the severance thereby was comprised in the thing granted. 5
The courts, however, seldom distinguish the terms, but instead are inclined to use them interchangeably due to the narrowness of the distinction.
In the United States, the rule that an attempted reservation to a stranger to the deed is void, is still recognized and
effectuated. 6 However, probably a majority,7 although not all,8
of the jurisdictions of this country make an exception to the
rule where the person to whom the reservation is made is
the spouse of the grantor.
EFFECTUATION AS RESERVATION

There are at least three, and probably four, theories on
which this exception may be and is, by various jurisdictions,
justified. The first of these methods by which the reservation
to the spouse of the grantor is effectuated is by excepting the
wife from that class who are strangers to the deed because
of her interest in the premises which stems from the marital
relation. It should be noted that by this theory the interest in
the spouse is passed by means of the reservation as such.
The application of this theory is well illustrated by the Illinois
case of Saunders v. Saunders.9 There it was held that the
marital rights of the grantor's spouse (statutory dower in
husband, dower in wife, expectancy of inheritance) was a
sufficient interest in the premise to support the reservation
of a life estate. Although in this case, the non-owning spouse
joined in the conveyance, which act in that state effectively
waived the marital rights of such spouse, other cases have
5. 16 AM. Jun. 607, § 298.
6. Deaver v. Aaron, 159 Ga. 597, 126 S. E. 382, 39 A. L. R. 126
(1925); Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73 (N. Y. 1812); see note, 39

A. L. R. 128, and cases cited therein.
7. "The weight of authority supports the view that a deed of the kind
here involved operates as giving both husband and wife a life estate".
Saunders v. Saunders, 373 I1. 302, 26 N. E. 2d 126 (1940); see cases
cited in note, 129 A. L. R. 310.
8. Lemon v. Lemon, 273 Mo. 484, 201 S. W. 103 (1918); Ogle v. Barker, 224 Ind. 489, 68 N. E. 2d 550 (1946).
9. 373 Ill. 302, 26 N. E. 2d 126, 129 A. L. R. 306 (1940).
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applied the same reasoning where the non-owning spouse did
not join in the conveyance.' 0
By applying this reasoning, the courts allow, in many cases,
a reservation of a larger interest than the non-owning spouse
initially had. This is, of course, in conflict with the common
law requirements for an effective reservation." In the absence
of another method to reach the same result, as for example,
in a jurisdiction where prior decisions have closed the door
on the other two theories, this slight deviation from the strict
requirements of the common law is well justified.
In states having neither statutory dower in the husband,
nor curtesy, the objection to the effectuation of a reservation
of a greater interest in the premises than formerly existed,
would perhaps be stronger in a situation where the grantor
is the wife and the non-owning spouse to whom the reservation is made is the husband. The increased strength of this
objection would arise from the fact that the non-owning
spouse's interest is founded on dower, homestead and expectancy of inheritance. Since the husband has, of course, no
dower nor curtesy, and homestead in any particular case may
not exist, and the expectancy of inheritance is at most speculative, it could be argued, that the husband has insufficient
interest to remove him from the class of strangers to the deed.
EFFECTUATION AS A COVENANT TO STAND SEIZED TO USES
Another method by which the estate attempted to be reserved to the spouse of the grantor is validated is by construing the limitation as a covenant by the grantor to stand seized
to the use of the non-owning spouse. The requirements for a
limitation to be effective as a covenant to stand seized to uses
are: a consideration of love and affection, 12 a relationship of
3
blood or marriage between the convenantor and convenantee,
and a reservation of an interest in the grantor. 14 An at10. Rollins v. Davis, 96 Ga. 107, 23 S. E. 392 (1895); Murphy v.
Merritt, 48 N. C. 37 (1855); McDonald v. Jarvis, 64 W. Va. 62, 60 S. E.
990 (1908).
11. Note 3, supra.

12. Milledge v. Lamar, 4 DeSaus. Eq. 417 (S. C. 1816).
13. Chancellor v. Windham, 1 Rich. 161, 42 Am. Dec. 411 (S. C. 1844).
14. Cresswell v. Bank of Greenwood, 210 S. C. 47, 41 S. E. 2d 393
(1947). This requirement seems peculiar to South Carolina law. See
Crossing v. Scudamore, 2 Levinz 9, 83 Eng. Rep. 428 (1671); Vanhorn's
Lessee v. Harrison, 1 Dallas 137, 1 L. ed. 70 (Pa. 1765); Adams v. Ross,
1 Vroom 505, 82 Am. Dec. 237 (N. J. 1860).
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tempted reservation by a grantor husband and his non-owning
wife (who joined in the conveyance) of a life estate in a deed
of the fee to their son was sustained as creating a covenant
by the husband to stand seized to the use of the wife for her
life in the New York case of Wood v. Swart.15 After holding
that the deed could not operate by way of exception or reservation the court said:
... But it has effect and operation as a covenant to stand
seized, as it is within the principles adopted in BedeU's
Case, 7 Co., 133... In Bedell'- Coe... the question was,
whether any use arose to the wife, or not; and it was
resolved, that if a man covenant to stand seized to the
use of his wife, son or cousin, it shall raise a use, without any express words of consideration ... It is scarcely
necessary to observe, that in such a conveyance no technical words are required; such as that the grantor covenants to stand seized to the use of A, & c; but any other
words will create a covenant to stand seized, if it appears to have been the intention of the party to use them
for that purpose .... 16
Although the application of the covenant to stand seized
theory seems to be subject to no logical objection, and is some
broader in scope than the reservation theory, it too is subject
to limitations, which in some cases might necessitate the adoption of a broader theory. These limitations consist of the necessity of a relation of blood or marriage to the grantor, of
a consideration of love and affection, and, in South Carolina,
of a reservation of a life estate in the grantorl7a
RESERVATION CONSTRUED AS A GRANT

The third theory by which a reservation to the grantor's
spouse might be effectuated is by construing the reservation as a grant. This construction is justified by the reasoning
that the clear intention of the grantor should be carried out
if it can be done without violation of a rule of law or construction.

15. 20 Johns. 85 (N. Y. 1882); Acc., Eysaman v. Eysaman, 24 Hun.

480 (N. Y. 1881).
16. Id., at 87, 88.
17a. See note 14, supra.
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This theory has been applied principally to the reservation
of easements to a third person. Thus, in Long v. Fewer,17 the
court said:
it is urged that to construe this deed as granting an
easement would be to convert a reservation into a grant.
But the day is past for adhering to technical or literal
meaning of particular words in a deed or other contract
against the plain intention of the parties as gathered
from the entire instrument.' 8
...

And in Aldrich v. Soucheray,19 the court held that the word
"reserved", when used in connection with the word "excepting" will be held to mean "granted" if the manifest intention which would otherwise be defeated is thereby effectuated.
The Restatement of Property is in accord with the view
that an easement in terms reserved to a third party may be
effective as a grant.20 Also concurring in this view is Tiffany
in his work on Real Property, where he says: "It may be
questioned, however, whether such words of reservation might
not occasionally be construed as words of grant, vesting in the
third person named a life estate, with remainder in fee
simple". 21
This view not only appears as sound or more sound than
the first two theories, in that it established a desirable rule
of construction which violates no rule of law or other rule of
construction, but it also allows a broader effectuation of the
intention of the grantor without detracting from the stability of the applicable rules of law. By utilizing this theory,
what is in terms a reservation, whether made to a spouse of
the grantor, a person related by blood or marriage to the
grantor, or to a person coming within neither of these classes,
may be validated where the intention of the grantor is apparent. Apparently, the only deterrent to the application of
this theory is the relatively small amount of authority supporting it.

17. 53 Minn. 156, 54 N. W. 1071 (1893).

18. 54 N. W. at 1071.
19. 133 Minn. 382, 158 N. W. 637 (1916).
20. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 472, comment b (1944).
21. 4 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd Ed. 1939) § 974, p. 54.
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OTHER THEORIES

There is another possible theory by which a reservation to
22
a stranger to the deed might be effectuated. Some authority
supports the view that if a grantee accepted such a deed, in
which the grantor's intention is clear that a third person is
to take an interest thereunder, there is an implied agreement
by the grantee to hold the property for the benefit of the
third person, which agreement equity will enforce.
TREATMENT IN

SOUTH CAROLINA

Recently the South Carolina Supreme Court was squarely
faced, for the first time, 23 with the validity of an attempted
reservation of a life estate to the grantor's wife.24 The granting clause of the deed there presented read in part:
I, Robert B. Glasgow, . . . for and in consideration of
Five ($5.00) Dollars and love and affection which I bear
for my son . . . do grant, bargain, sell and release unto
the said Robert B. Glasgow, Jr., his heirs and assigns
forever, saving, excepting and reserving unto the grantor
herein, Robert B. Glasgow, and Mrs. Elizabeth Glasgow,
the use, occupancy, and possession of the property hereinafter described, for and during their natural lives and
the natural life of each of them; 25 ...
The habendum and general warranty clauses were in usual
form, to Robert B. Glasgow, Jr., his heirs and assigns. The
circuit court sustained the demurrer of the defendant, Robert
B. Glasgow, Jr., to the complaint of the plaintiff, Mrs. Elizabeth Glasgow, which sought a confirmation of the life estate
in plaintiff by way of a declaratory judgment.
The Supreme Court, in considering the case on appeal, first
determined, in an enlightening discussion, that the circuit
22. Eysaman v. Eysaman, 24 Hun. 430 (N. Y. 1881); Sherman v.
Estate of Dodge, 28 Ut. 26 (1885); see also 3 ScoTT ox TRUSTS § 467.2.

23. The South Carolina Supreme Court appears to have construed
limitations in which a reservation to the grantor's spouse appeared on
previous occasions, but that particular point was neither raised nor discussed. Branyan v. Tribble, 109 S. C. 58, 95 S. E. 137 (1917); Antley v.
Antley, 132 S. C. 306, 128 S. E. 31 (1925); Myrick v. Lewis, 139 S. C.
475, 138 S. E. 198 (1927) ; Drake v. Drake, 148 S. C. 147, 145 S. E. 705
(1928); First Carolinas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Ford, 177 S. C. 40,
180 S.E. 562 (1935).
24. Glasgow v. Glasgow, ...... S. C....... Westbrook Adv. Sheet, April
12, 1952.
25. Id., at page 8. (Emphasis supplied).
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judge was in error in holding that the attempted reservation
was void in that it attempted to cut down the estate granted
in the granting clause by superadded words.
The circuit court had also held that the attempted reservation to the plaintiff was void for the reason that the plaintiff, wife of the grantor, having no former interest in the
premises, was a stranger to the deed. The Supreme Court reversed this holding also, on the theory that the spouse of a
grantor has sufficient interest in the premises, by virtue of
dower, homestead and expectancy of inheritance, to except
such spouse from the class who are strangers to the deed.
In adopting this theory, the court did not overlook the possibility of construing the limitation as a covenant to stand
seized to use, or of construing it as a grant in effectuation of
the grantor's intention. The circuit court had expressly held,
without citing authority, that the limitation could not be construed as a covenant to stand seized to uses, to which the Supreme Court replied that this was possibly erroneous, but unnecessary to decide. The court justified the application of the
theory utilized by them by saying that it was sufficient to
reach the end under the facts of that case. Thus, the court
left the door open for a possible application of the other
theories if and when the necessity for their adoption occurs.
An examination of the cases in South Carolina reveals
no prior holding that would preclude the application of either
the covenant theory or the grant theory. In fact, some of
the prior decisions would seem to make the application of the
covenant to stand seized to uses theory most appropriate. For
example, in Cresswel v. Bank of Greenwood,26 it was said:
A covenant to stand seized was originally a device of
equity whereby the rigid rules of the common law were
circumvented in order to effectuate the manifest intention of the maker of a deed to grant a freehold to commence in the future and sometimes, at least, despite
absence of the technical words necessary at common law
27
to effect the conveyance intended by the instrument.
As to the construction of the reservation as a grant in
order to effectuate the intention of the grantor, the ground-

26. 210 S. C.47, 41 S. E. 2d 393 (1947).
27. Id., at 54.
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work in prior cases is probably even better laid, by Justice
Wardlaw's expressions in Chancellor v. Windham :28
Large and more sensible rules of construction require
that the whole deed should be considered together, and
effect be given to every part, if all can stand together consistently with law; that an exposition favorable to the
intention should be made, if not contrary to law; that
the intention should be regarded as looking rather to
the effect to be produced than the mode of producing it;
that too minute a stress should not be laid on particular
words, if the intention be clear--andthat, if the deed cannot operate in the mode contemplated by the parties, it
should be construed in such a manner as to operate, if
29
possible, in some other way.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the South Carolina Court in the Glasgow
case, supra, is to be commended for the soundness of the result which it reaches in the particular case, as well as for itss
indication of the court's liberal approach to such problems in
the field of conveyancing. In an area of the law which must
necessarily cling to precedent in order to maintain stability,
the court has shown a fine discrimination. Without repudiating
a rule of law, the court has followed the lead of other American jurisdictions and engrafted a desirable and needed exception onto the rule. The theory chosen is ample for the factual
situation presented. More important, the opinion seems to
indicate that in a proper case in which one of the broader
views above discussed is necessary, the court will not hesitate
to adopt such a view in order to attain the desired result.
J. F. BUZHARDT, JR

28. 1 Rich., 161 (S. C. 1844).
29. Id., at 167. (Emphasis supplied).
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